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A B S T R A C T
This study investigates the relationship between violent conﬂict, food price, and climate variability at the
subnational level. Using disaggregated data on 113 African markets from January 1997 to April 2010,
interrelationships between the three variables are analyzed in simultaneous equation models. We ﬁnd
that: (i) a positive feedback exists between food price and violence – higher food prices increase conﬂict
rates within markets and conﬂict increases food prices; (ii) anomalously dry conditions are associated
with increased frequencies of conﬂict; and (iii) decreased rainfall exerts an indirect effect on conﬂict
through its impact on food prices. These ﬁndings suggest that the negative effects of climate variability
on conﬂict can be mitigated by interventions and effective price management in local markets. Creating
environments in which food prices are stable and reliable, and markets are accessible and safe, can lower
the impacts of both climate change and conﬂict feedbacks.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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inter-related
In this article, we explore how mediating factors are critical
components of climate security. We investigate whether food
insecurity, and in particular food price, may serve as just such a
mediating factor. Food price is a key indicator because it acts as a
local and dynamic measure of scarcity and competition, and hence
an appropriate proxy for food insecurity, and may inﬂuence the
variable forms of violent collective action occurring across
developing countries.
The dynamics, scale and direction of mediating relationships
between climate, food price and conﬂict has recently caught the
attention of researchers, who generally ﬁnd positive links between
food price increases and violence. Yet, studies differ on the type,
scale and evidence of the relationship between prices and conﬂict:
Bellemare (2014) links monthly global food price data with media
reports of riots within countries between 1990 and 2011; Smith
(2014) ﬁnds sudden, monthly, increases in domestic prices of ‘food§ Support for this research was provided by the European Research Council
(GEOPV 283755). Replication data and Stata codes will be available online at http://
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4.0/).baskets’ increases the probability of urban unrest; and Hendrix and
Brinkman (2013) regard food insecurity and rising prices as a
‘threat multiplier’ for civil conﬂicts, with a focus on riots.
Previous research largely focuses on ‘food riots’ that occurred in
2007–2008; yet a focus on riots implies that these actions are the
most obvious response to food insecurity, and limits the range of
political expression that can manifest from pressure, scarcity or
marginalization as experienced by groups in developing countries.
It also obscures how food prices and insecurity play into a range of
other conﬂict inducing factors, as opposed to being a solitary
trigger (see Demarest, 2014). We contend that how food price and
climate inﬂuence political violence is largely determined by the
goals and coordination abilities of affected groups, who incorpo-
rate the experiences of marginalization and hardship into their
respective conﬂict strategies.
Additional issues that we address here is how the scale of these
phenomena is a key feature in their relationships, and how climate,
conﬂict and food price may exhibit non-linear and interactive
relationships. We posit that the key attribute of these instabilities
is their local nature: the price of commodities sold in local and
regional African markets are largely unaffected by global prices
and shifts; a wide range of political violence is localized; and
climate and environmental change is mainly experienced and
adapted to on the local level. Tests on the subnational scale are
therefore the main way to accommodate the reality of how these
three factors interact. We suggest that future interactions betweene under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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political intervention, aid and state capacity.
This article is the ﬁrst to model the relationship between
climate, food price and conﬂict sub-nationally, over time and
across multiple states. By concentrating on the parameters of
subnational relationships, we can more accurately capture the
mechanisms that underlie variation and change, and identify the
ways in which endogenous factors respond to stimuli. Further, in
treating these instabilities as continuous and varying, we model
the presumed interrelationships that now underscore policy
narratives and future directions of development aid and humani-
tarian assistance. Here, we aim to address whether exogenous
climate shifts increase conﬂict rates and volatility, how and
whether food price ﬂuctuations increase conﬂict, and ﬁnally, if
there an indirect relationship between climate change and conﬂict
through the impact of food price.
We ﬁnd that a feedback exists between food price and political
violence: higher food prices increase conﬂict within markets, and
conﬂict increases food price. Lower than expected levels of rainfall
directly increase food price and indirectly increase conﬂict through
its impact on food price. These results mainly suggest that conﬂict
rates and cycles can be contained through interventions and effective
price management in local markets. Creating environments in which
food prices are stable and reliable, and markets are accessible and
safe, can lower the impacts of both climate change and conﬂict
feedbacks. Hence local institutions have a signiﬁcant role to play in
instability, environmental and food security management.
These results have a larger signiﬁcance through their assertions
of how governance can attend to this issue: food security is a key
development priority for all African states as over 60% of Africans
are episodically food insecure and one quarter are chronically food
insecure, deﬁned as situations in which people spend up to half of
income on food (Barrett, 2008; Swan et al., 2010; Arndt et al.,
2008). The margins for impending food price crises continue to
narrow as the majority of rural and urban Africans are now food
purchasers instead of solely producers (Poulton et al., 2006: 343;
Barrett, 2008; Swan et al., 2010; Maxwell et al., 2010).
Understanding the interaction between climate, food and political
instability is critical for both governments and citizens.
The article proceeds as follows: we review the recent literature
on food price and conﬂict, and climate’s impact on both conﬂict
and price. We then present a unique interpretation of the
sequential and interactive relationships and feedbacks between
these three instabilities. This is followed by a discussion of data,
measures and simultaneous equations model results, and ﬁnally, a
discussion centred on the implications for the African continent.
2. Existing evidence and remaining questions about the
relationships between climate, food price, and political
violence across Africa
A key advance of this study is the assessment and modelling of
subnational patterns of, and dynamics between, instabilities.
Existing literature argues that direct, linear relationships should
exist between climate and conﬂict, food price and conﬂict, and
climate and food price. However, there is little in the way of
complementary conclusions in this literature, in part due to the
different scales and mechanisms employed to test presumed
relationships. Indeed, the environmental security literature is
characterized by opposite and conditional results that often obscure
links between physical antecedents and political consequences.
2.1. Food price and conﬂict
The food crisis of 2007–2008 led to a wave of research
correlating global food price changes to increases in politicalviolence, often in the forms of ‘food riots’. What constitutes a food
riot, and comparisons between other forms of conﬂict, are often
not systematic in this literature (Demarest, 2014). Indeed, in some
cases (see Bellemare, 2014), the number of food riot reports,
instead of actual events, is the object of study Bellemare (2014),
Hendrix et al. (2009), Lagi et al. (2011), and Bereneza and Lee
(2013), as well as multiple aid agencies and multilateral
organizations (see Pomeroy, 2008; Lacey, 2008), argue that
increases in African rioting was due to high and rising international
commodity prices. Smith (2014) ﬁnds the same relationship
between national price indices and speciﬁcally ‘urban’ unrest. The
correlation between international food prices and presumed ‘anti-
government’ demonstrators is, to Arezeki and Bru¨ckner (2011), a
powerful effect that is stronger in low-income countries because of
the greater sensitivity of poor households to price increases. In
these cases, price increases lead to conﬂict over price stability or
volatility (see Barrett and Bellemare, 2011). The underlying
presumption is that poor populations protest how governments
expose them to high, unpredictable prices that create scarcity and
competition for necessary, but limited, resources.
Commodities and price differences may also affect a group’s
willingness to engage in different forms of violence: Besley and
Persson (2008) ﬁnd that the risk of civil conﬂict grows as a
country’s import prices increase and erode real incomes. This
correlation is conﬁrmed in a Colombian study where Dube and
Vargas (2013) report that two primary commodities alter conﬂict
risks differently: in rural, coffee growing areas, militia violence is
reduced when export prices rise for coffee. However, in resource
wealthy regions where oil is a capital intensive source of income
for rebels and paramilitary groups, higher export prices for oil
increases violence (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012). In studies with
alternative measures of the poor’s access to food, countries with
lower per capita caloric intake are associated with greater
probability of civil conﬂict (Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa,
2008), even when accounting for their levels of economic
development (Sobek and Boehmer, 2008). The main mechanisms
linking commodity prices to multiple forms of political violence is
increased grievances due to scarcity, or opportunities for income
generation.
In unstable states, a feedback between food price and conﬂict is
expected to occur as political violence exerts a negative effect on
local market functioning and leads to higher food prices and
volatility (Devereux and Maxwell, 2001; Auyero and Moran, 2007).
Commodity prices may rise due to excessive risks and transport
costs, harvest costs, and market security costs. Another possibility
is that food aid found in high conﬂict areas will corrupt market
costs and keep prices artiﬁcially low (Maxwell et al., 2010). This
suggests that price volatility, rather than price increases, is more
likely in conﬂict affected regions.
2.2. Climate, prices and conﬂict
A rapidly changing climate, food availability and access,
increased competition and conﬂict are central tenets of environ-
mental security discourse (Barnett, 2010). The direct relationship
between rainfall variation and conﬂict has been tested on a range of
spatial scales, and across multiple types of conﬂict. The mecha-
nism(s) through which climate and weather affects violence is
largely unsubstantiated, but scarcity, competition, and strategic
opportunity are frequently presented as likely explanations. The
‘‘scarcity’’ perspective suggests that increased conﬂict follows
depressed environmental conditions, creating marginalization
and intense competition for resources. By contrast, the resource
‘‘abundance’’ perspective suggests that the rainy season encourages
rent-seeking behaviour, and thereby facilitates the recruitment of
people for violent acts.
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conﬂict are inconsistent, and cannot afﬁrm a scarcity or competi-
tion narrative. Higher anomalous rainfall is associated with
increased communal conﬂict levels but decreased civil war; while
drier conditions have the opposite effect (Raleigh and Kniveton,
2012). Further evidence for the impact of both high and low rainfall
is found by Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) and Theisen (2012).
Witsenburg and Adano (2007) argue that conﬂict rates in rural,
vulnerable areas are strongly seasonal, and highest in periods
preceding high rainfall when strategic efforts to gain territory and
control of migration paths are likely to return greater beneﬁts.
Similarly, cattle raiding is more common during the wet season in
pastoral areas because of favourable operating environments and
healthier animals (Adano et al., 2012). Rainy months may also
increase the cover necessary to launch surprise-raiding attacks
(Meier et al., 2007).
Recent disaggregated climate–conﬂict studies consider the
indirect role of climate through mediating factors. Food availability
and access function as such mediators since both rainfall and
temperature affect food production and yields. Climate change
‘‘affects the supply side of agriculture primarily through its
impacts on productivity, yields and the availability of land and
water’’ (Huang et al., 2011). Climate change has already worsened
crop production, labour market stagnation, and price levels and
competition in food insecure countries (Maxwell et al., 2010). Both
long and short deviations from the climatic mean can create
scarcity through limited production and/or reduced yields. Yet,
there remains substantial disagreement about the sequencing and
certainty of whether decreased yields correlate to scarcity,
competition and violence: Rowhani et al.’s (2011) study of East
Africa ﬁnds that on both regional and village levels, decreased
yields are not related to violence, and conﬂict is more likely in areas
of high vegetation.
Speciﬁcally, the presumption that food price increases create
scarcities and competition for resources is an indirect assumption
of neomalthusian conﬂict logics (Demarest, 2014). Indeed, food
prices are an increasingly posited, but rarely tested, intervening
variable in the climate-security literature (see Berazneva and Lee,
2013; Zhang et al., 2010; Koubi et al., 2012).
Food price can be a proxy indicator for larger economic forces,
and represent how these pressures affect conﬂict. It is through
local economic constraints that most people are coping with
present climate change, as farmers manage decreased yields, crop
loss, pests and commodity crises as an indirect result of changing
agriculture conditions. In most African countries, over 60% of the
labour force is involved in agriculture (Beintema and Stads, 2004).
The majority rely on rain-fed agriculture as the basis for their
livelihood on smallholder farms, and 95% of cultivated land is
under rain-fed agriculture (Rockstro¨m, 2003). By associating
conﬂict with ﬂuctuating environmental conditions and food
insecurity through income, Miguel et al. (2004) argue that
nationally aggregated changes in rainfall leads to negative
economic growth, and increase the risk of civil war across African
states. Lower economic growth creates grievances in employable
young men, and further lessens the cost of rebellion through
opening avenues of recruitment. Further tests of this argument
have found that lower rainfall levels actually lessen the onset of
civil wars, and that the original positive effect is not robust under
additional speciﬁcations (Ciccone, 2011; Jensen and Gleditsch,
2009). At present, climate variability has found to have little to no
effect on the risk of violence through reduced economic growth
(Koubi et al., 2012).
What emerges from this literature is that regardless of the
direction or speciﬁc combination of factors, conﬂict patterns and
risks are contingent upon political and economic characteristics of
states (see Barnett, 2000; Norda˚s and Gleditsch, 2007; Raleigh andUrdal, 2007; Theisen, 2008). But not all places are equally
vulnerable to the adverse effects of price, climate, and political
and economic insecurity. Agricultural productivity, household
incomes and African food prices are still primarily a function of the
economic and social characteristics of local areas (Eriksen et al.,
2005; Paavola, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2011; Mendelsohn et al., 2007;
Jones and Thornton, 2009; Dougill et al., 2010; Badjeck et al., 2010;
Hertel et al., 2010). Recent evidence suggests that environmental
changes affect conﬂict rates only in areas with existing high
violence rates (O’Loughlin et al., 2014). Further, rural areas with
the most degraded environments are sites of high poverty rates
and food insecurity (Gray and Moseley, 2005), often dependent on
rain-fed agriculture, and subject to high levels of vulnerability to
ecological shifts and resultant volatility (Kevane and Gray, 2008).
Many of these same communities have a higher risk of identity-
based violence between small ethnic communities (Raleigh, 2010).
In contrast, areas involved in cash cropping tend to be geographi-
cally concentrated in the most fertile and politically connected
areas of the state (see Kasara, 2007; Boone, 2003) and suffer less
extreme consequences from climatic shifts, possibly due to pre-
emptive measures and higher rates of development.
2.3. Local factors
From the premise establish above, we can surmise that the scale
at which phenomena are studied is of paramount importance:
price variation, conﬂict rates and vulnerability to climate anoma-
lies vary substantially at the local level, across states and over time
in Africa.
2.3.1. Food price
Local crops types, infrastructure, local climate, seasonality, and
select commodity yields are the most important indicators of price
stability and rates across Africa; therefore food prices for staple
commodities are largely locally determined. The 2007–2008 crisis
is an exception to this, as staple food prices rose 63%; although
lower than the global average food price increase, this increase was
an aberration from typical patterns. The vast majority of African
local markets are not affected by world food prices, despite the
growing number of food purchasers. Rice prices are an exception
(Minot, 2010). Changes to yield expectation affects commodity
price, yet depressed crop yields or higher food prices are not
immediately or deﬁnitively associated with food insecurity.
Several crops on the local level are ‘substitutable’ and price
transmission is strong across multiple states (Arndt et al., 2008;
Cudjoe et al., 2010). Most food price vacillation is seasonal,
occurring predictably preceding a harvest and at the end of the
rainy period. In these periods, food stores decline and food prices
hit normal peaks (Devereux et al., 2008; Barrett, 2008). Prices are
also determined by market functionality, which often depends on
relative ‘remoteness’, as accessible markets, and those closer to the
capital, are typically larger and characterized by higher and more
reliable supplies of food and infrastructural beneﬁts. Domestic
upsets to farming can cause severe market problems: climate
disorders, long-term political instability, or misguided government
intervention (e.g. Zimbabwe’s land reallocation policy) all hinder
trade. Overall, evidence suggests that along with the conditions for
productive yields, market health and management are key aspects
of price stability.
Despite the presumption that global trends create large scale
and widespread price transmission, global food prices are poor
representations of African market prices for several reasons: most
African states are neither major importers nor exporters. The vast
majority (90%) of food consumed in Africa is from domestic
producers, and poor infrastructure and policy obstacles (e.g. tariffs)
dampen trade and exchange (Barrett, 2013). Yet, particular
Fig. 1. A structural model of conﬂict, food price, and rainfall.
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volatile and negatively inﬂuenced by market ﬂuctuations nation-
ally and globally. In periods of crisis, such as 2007–2008, the
impact of global prices did not directly affect many of the staple
consumables sold in local African markets (including beans,
cassava, millet and sorghum); their muted price increases came
from increased demand as a substitute for rice, maize and wheat,
whose prices were strongly affected (Minot, 2010; Swan et al.,
2010). Tradability has a strong effect on the price increases and
volatility of African staple foods, yet the vast majority of consumed
goods have intra-state trading networks (Minot, 2010). Hence,
African commodity price vacillation is often insulated from price
transmissions (Ivanic et al., 2012; Ghosh, 2010; Minot, 2010). The
exceptions are areas with a high reliance on imported food (often
rice), such as port cities (Swan et al., 2010). Consequentially,
African domestic food prices are often more stable than global
prices (Byerlee et al., 2006), especially so in landlocked states and
those otherwise removed from the global economy.
2.3.2. Local political violence
Political violence is the use of force by a group with a political
purpose or motivation, and involves contests between groups at
the local, regional or national level. Multiple forms of conﬂict are
often locally clustered, as are reasons for their onset. Violent
groups rarely operate across large portions of a state, even for large
insurgent campaigns: Raleigh et al. (2014) show that civil war
occurrence is largely clustered within 15% of a state’s territory, and
multiple types of political violence show high rates of repeat
behaviour and near-neighbour diffusion (Behlendorf et al., 2012;
Zammit-Mangion et al., 2013). Further, multiple authors have
recently highlighted the essentially ‘local’ cleavages and nature of
larger conﬂicts in who and where is targeted (see Kalyvas, 2006;
Rustad et al., 2011).
Considering the widespread and persistent nature of modern
African conﬂict, understanding how local factors shape conﬂict
trajectories is of critical importance. Research on subnational
variations suggest that population density and institutional
structures (Raleigh and Hegre, 2009; Cederman and Girardin,
2007), wealth variation and environmental characteristics
(Buhaug and Rød, 2006), political exclusion (Cederman et al.,
2011) and physical factors (Herbst, 2000) are key inﬂuences in
determining where civil wars are likely to occur. This research
tells us about common location characteristics for one speciﬁc
form of conﬂict, yet multiple forms of political violence are
spatially distinct but temporally co-occur. Indeed, Raleigh (2014)
notes that civil wars, militia actions and communal violence co-
occur with limited spatial overlap, as each form is uniquely
structured by the relationship between groups and governments,
and the goals of the conﬂict agents. Hence, the form of political
violence that is likely to arise in localities is endogenous to the
political relationships found within.
For that reason, a focus on riots, or any other particular form of
conﬂict, presupposes a standard reaction to local experiences of
marginalization and hardship. ‘Food price’ riots are overwhelm-
ingly an urban phenomenon (Barrett, 2013) and often involve
middle class and wealthier citizens over the more vulnerable poor,
who have limited collective action mechanisms, despite the impact
of high prices on this community. Indeed, food price riots are very
difﬁcult to identify, as concerns over the price of living in a
common factor in both protests and riots across Africa; further-
more, any assumption of event cause can be highly biased
(Demarest, 2014).
But, the intensity and frequency of all conﬂicts can be
exacerbated by price variations, including competition for market
dominance (Minot, 2010). Market locations are areas of strategic
and target interests, and violence allows for control overparticularly lucrative markets or trades; a study from Nigeria
conﬁrms that ‘‘markets often become ﬂashpoints both because
they bring large numbers of people from different ethnic groups
together in a congested area, and because they offer a fertile
context for ‘conﬂict entrepreneurs’ to exploit conﬂict for business
or political ends. Unemployed youth can be hired at little cost in
order to escalate any small conﬂict that occurs’’ (Porter et al., 2005:
2). Further, increasing prices for commodities may inﬂuence prices
for livestock, milk, etc. making cattle raiding behaviour more
lucrative for communal violence contenders. Finally, blaming high
prices on ineffective governance may increase support for rebel or
militia groups across their supportive communities. In short,
multiple forms of conﬂict co-exist within states, with localized
expressions and logics that transcend mono-causal assumptions
like ‘food price’.
2.4. Interactions
In addition to testing our questions on the subnational level, we
argue that the dynamics between climate, price and conﬂict is
conditional, interactive and sequential: we propose that three
direct and indirect relationships may exist between the three key
instabilities, in which climate change is exogenous to food price
and conﬂict, while food price and conﬂict rates are endogenous to
each other: (1) climate changes can create conditions for increased
conﬂict; (2) increased food prices can create conditions for
increased conﬂict; (3) climate changes can lead to vacillations in
food price, which in turn create conditions for a rise in conﬂict. We
express these relationships graphically in Fig. 1.
In keeping with the subnational literature on rainfall and
conﬂict, our ﬁrst (1a) and second hypothesis (1b) is that both a
positive and a negative relationship exist between rainfall and
conﬂict.
Hypothesis 1a. Signiﬁcantly decreased rainfall increases conﬂict.
Hypothesis 1b. Signiﬁcantly increased rainfall increases conﬂict.
We then suggest that, across markets, increasing food price
should have an immediate and localized effect on conﬂict rates
(2a), and that price and conﬂict demonstrate a feedback between
high rates of both.
Hypothesis 2a. Increasing food prices lead to higher conﬂict event
rates.
Hypothesis 2b. A positive feedback exists between food price and
conﬂict levels.
Finally, we suggest an additional mode through which price can
affect violence: climate’s impact on conﬂict should be mediated
through its impact on food price.
Hypothesis 3. Anomalous climate events will increase food price,
which then increases the rate of political violence.
Fig. 2. Coverage of markets by African states. Notes: Coloured states are included in the analysis. Deeper colours reﬂect more markets within states.
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The study area covers 113 markets in ﬁrst level administrative
regions in 24 African states (see Fig. 2). The selection is driven by
the availability of commodity price information over time and
across markets. This analysis covers countries with a range of
political, economic, social and environmental characteristics. Of
the 24 states, several have ongoing civil wars and all have some
reported political violence during the dataset’s time frame. Our
unit of analysis is the administration-month period, clustered in
county-years from January 1997 to April 2010; an increasing
number of markets are incorporated throughout the timeframe.
The resulting dataset includes 11,659 administrative-month
units.
Markets included in this analysis and the food price data
generally represent the main trading town in a ﬁrst level
administration district, and the patterns uncovered here can be
considered broadly reﬂective of how food price and volatility vary
within and across administrations within states. Main markets are
‘price setters’ in that smaller markets located within ﬁrst level
administration districts often follow their price signals (Renkow
et al., 2004). This is largely due to intra-region price transmission
and similar commodity choices therein.
Our main interests are the reciprocal relationships between
food price and political violence, and the sequencing of the
conﬂict–climate relationship. To estimate these, we specify a
simultaneous-equations model with one equation for food price
and another for the number of conﬂict events. In addition to the bi-
directional relationship between food price and conﬂict, we also
include several exogenous and predetermined variables in each
equation to meet the conditions for identiﬁcation. The system oftwo equations takes the following basic form:
Commodityt ¼ b0 þ b1 Con flictt þ
Xi¼n
i¼1
½b2 RainðÞti
þ b3 GlobalPricet þ b4 RainySeasont
þ b5 Commodityt1 (1)
Conflictt ¼ b6 þ b7 Commodityt þ b8 CivilWart
þ b9 Democracyt þ b10 Growtht þ b11 Conflictt1 (2)
As such, we utilize two observed endogenous variables:
Commodityt and Conﬂictt. Commodityt is the natural log of
commodity price (per kilogram) within a given market and month.
Commodity data are from USAID FEWS-Net and reports commodi-
ty prices across African markets for variable time ranges. Often
information on several commodities is collected, but not consis-
tently within the same market. To rectify this, our analysis uses the
monthly price of the most frequent commodity within each
market; staple crops are often the most consistently reported
commodity information by market. However, staple crops differ
within and across countries. For example, matoke is the staple crop
of southern Uganda, whereas sorghum and millet are the main
consumed crops in western and northern Uganda. Price volatility
varies across market administrations, although a sharp increase is
displayed from 2007 to 2008 in many of the markets where mean
prices for most commodities doubled. There is smaller variation
thereafter. Several studies of food price and conﬂict operationalize
commodity prices as the percentage change in price from the
previous year (O’Loughlin et al., 2012; Smith, 2014). However,
given the temporal unit of our analysis (month) and a strong
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many months with unusually high commodity prices have a value
of near zero. For this reason, we use a standardized measure of
commodity price rather than a measure of its change. Fig. 3
displays changes in the Commodityt variable in 6 selected markets.
Conﬂictt is the natural log of the number of violent conﬂict
events in a given market and month. The conﬂict data comes from
the geo-referenced Armed Conﬂict Location and Event dataset
(ACLED) those records the date, location, actors, and types of
conﬂict activity across all African countries between 1997 and into
real time (Raleigh et al., 2010). For this study, we aggregated the
number of violent events by month from 1997 to 2010 within each
market administration district. We use all forms and events of
political conﬂict for two reasons: there is no standard violent
reaction to climate or food prices, and different communities
engage in multiple types of violence that are shaped by political
relationships and institutions instead of direct grievances (Choi
and Raleigh, 2015). The Conﬂictt variable incorporates instances of
violence against civilians (VAC) by state actors. One may argue that
state-sponsored VAC is not driven by food scarcity and increased
grievances. To address this potential problem, we performed
robustness tests after removing the instances of state-sponsored
VAC from the Conﬂictt variable. The results of robustness tests are
reported in Appendix Table A1.
Climate is integrated into this analysis in the form of multiple
parameters; each is designed to reﬂect how climate variations over
time affect the productivity, scarcity and competition for
resources. Together with temperature, rainfall primarily deter-
mines the amount of water available for crop production. However,Fig. 3. Commodity prices in selected African markets. Notes: Prices are lorainfall varies over scales of tens of metres and seconds while
temperatures variation is much less both spatially and temporally.
Rainfall also has a complex inter-annual variability and sharp
gradient, meaning that the change from excessively wet to dry can
take place over a small area. High spatial variability, coupled with
poor distribution of rain gauges, means that there are few
continuous measurements of rainfall for much of Africa. Meteor-
ologists and climatologists often therefore rely on satellite data
that use indirect measures of rainfall. In particular, ﬁne-grained
temporal and spatial measures are necessary to capture the
variation in rainfall for communities at risk.
Even in areas with high rates of rainfall, temporal variation can
severely affect water supply, both from river runoff and rainfall
(Vorosmarty et al., 2005). Rain-fed agriculture problems in water
scarcity prone tropics are largely a function of the high intensity
and spatial and temporal variability in rainfall, rather than low
cumulative volumes (Mahoo et al., 1999; Rockstro¨m et al., 1998).
The result is a high risk of meteorological drought and intra-season
dry spells: the likelihood remains once every 10 years, while the
occurrence of dry spells (short periods of 2–4 weeks without
rainfall) are far more common.
Many studies use the amount of rainfall as a reliable indicator of
climate variability (Solomon et al., 2007; Fjelde and von Uexkull,
2012; Raleigh and Kniveton, 2012). These variables use informa-
tion from the CPC Merged Analysis of Precipitation (CMAP) to
record monthly averaged precipitation rates (mm/day) for each
250 km  250 km site where a market is based (Xie and Arkin,
1997). Average rainfall variation by year is relatively low, although
average anomalies vary considerably over the study’s time period.g transformed and centred by their respective market mean values.
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include positive or negative deviations of rainfall (Rain(+)t,
Rain()t), the presence of dry conditions (Drought), a country’s
rainy season (RainySeasont), and global food price index (Global-
Pricet). These are all distinct variability measures. Following
Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) and Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012),
we generate the rainfall anomaly variables in the following way:
for each market and month, we calculate the deviation of rainfall
from the long-term average (1997–2010) and divide this score by
the standard deviation of precipitation rates. Then, the variable
Rain(+)t takes the value of positive rainfall deviations while setting
all negative deviations to zero. On the other hand, the variable
Rain()t takes the absolute value of negative deviations and sets all
positive numbers to zero. By not imposing any parametric form on
this relationship (such as a conventional quadratic function), these
variables – Rain(+)t and Rain()t – more accurately measure the
different effects of rainfall anomalies on conﬂict. As an alternative
indicator of climate anomaly, we also construct a dichotomous
variable Drought that takes the value of 1 if a market’s rainfall
remained considerably below average (that is, greater than one
standard deviation below the long-term mean) during the four
preceding months, and 0 otherwise.
Next, the RainySeasont dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a
country is in the rainy season for a given month, and 0 otherwise.
Rainy season months vary within and across countries, and this
variable reﬂects the reported season for the administrative
district of each market. For example, within Nigeria, the rainy
season for Dandume district is a 5 month period from May to
September while Bodija district’s rainy season falls into two
periods, March–July and September–October. Violence and
commodity prices slightly vary by whether it is a rainy season;
but the effects are not signiﬁcant. We also include dummy
variables for each month (using December as a reference
category) to control for any remaining seasonal effects on
commodity prices.
In addition, we utilize the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s
Global Food Price Index (GlobalPricet) as an additional exogenous
variable in Eq. (1). The monthly IMF Food Price Index is the average
of individual commodity price indices, weighted by their share in
the volume of global food trade in 2005. The GlobalPricet variable
also serves as an instrumental variable for local commodity price in
Eq. (2). We believe that GlobalPricet satisﬁes the good instrument
conditions suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2010: 178): (1) it is
exogenous because changes in food prices in local African markets
are unlikely to impact global prices; (2) it is relevant because some
of the local commodity prices may be inﬂuenced by changes in
global prices (the correlation coefﬁcient between GlobalFoodt and
Commodityt is 0.459); and (3) it is exclusive because changes in
global food prices may affect conﬂict rates only indirectly through
local prices.
Finally, we include lagged values of commodity price
(Commodityt1) as a predetermined variable to account for a
sluggish adjustment of prices to external shocks (Arezeki and
Hasanov, 2009), and to address the potential problem of
autocorrelation in the time-varying dataset (Wilson and Butler,
2007). According to Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), the inclusion
of lagged dependent variable may also help to capture the effects of
omitted relevant variables.
Exogenous variables in the conﬂict equation – Eq. (2) – include
the presence of civil war (CivilWart), the level of democracy
(Democracyt), and economic growth (Growtht). CivilWart is a
dichotomous variable that equals 1 when a market is located in
a country undergoing civil war that reaches a threshold of
25 battle-related deaths within a given month, and 0 otherwise
(Gleditsch et al., 2002). Conﬂict events are expected to occur more
frequently in markets in times of civil war.We include Democracyt and Growtht as indicators of socioeco-
nomic development and grievances. Democracyt is a 21-point index
of democracy from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers,
2011), and have been found to be signiﬁcant predictors of civil war
in previous research (see Hegre et al., 2001). Growtht is obtained
from the World Bank (2014)’s World Development Indicators, and
is measured by dividing the current year’s GDP by the previous
year’s GDP. Lower levels of economic growth are expected to
increase the risk of conﬂict by decreasing the opportunity cost of
rebellion (Collier and Hoefﬂery, 2004). Finally, we include the
lagged number of conﬂict events (Conﬂictt1) as a predetermined
variable. The inclusion of lagged dependent variable helps account
for the effects of inertia in conﬂict behaviour and deal with the
problem of serial correlation.
A set of exogenous variables in Eq. (1) aid in the identiﬁcation of
the Eq. (2). At the same time, CivilWart, Democracyt, Growtht, and
Conﬂictt1 in Eq. (2) help identify Eq. (1). That is, both equations are
over-identiﬁed. All variables – except for Rain(+)t, Rain()t, and
Drought – are centred around their respective market means to
control for any unobserved differences between markets that are
constant over time; these variables are already centred on the
long-term average precipitation rate within each market. Center-
ing all observations on their cluster means is equivalent to the
ﬁxed effects model, and allows us to obtain purely within-market
effects of explanatory variables (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008:
111–112). Fig. 4 shows the distribution of two endogenous
variables, while Table 1 provides summary statistics for all
endogenous and exogenous variables. Lastly, we use cluster-
robust standard errors in all of our regression models to account for
the data structure that is clustered at the market level.
4. Results
Table 2 presents the results of maximum likelihood estimation
of simultaneous equations for conﬂict and commodity price. Model
1 is a baseline speciﬁcation that includes Commodityt, Conﬂictt, and
exogenous control variables. The results in Model 1 are consistent
with our expectation that food price and violent conﬂict are in a
reciprocal relationship. The coefﬁcient on Conﬂictt in the commod-
ity equation is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level,
indicating that higher number of conﬂict events contribute to
higher food prices. When the number of conﬂict events is doubled,
food price is expected to increase by about 1.6 percent in a given
market and month, holding that market’s other covariates ﬁxed
(when both Y and X are log-transformed, their relationship can be
interpreted as the expected percentage change in Y when X
increases by one percentage point). The coefﬁcient on Commodityt
in the conﬂict equation is also positive and signiﬁcant, or
increasing food prices lead to higher number of conﬂict events,
thus supporting Hypothesis 2a. A 100 percent increase in food
prices is associated with a 13 percent increase in the expected
number of conﬂict events within a given market and month. Fig. 5
displays the reciprocal effects of food price and conﬂict on each
other. Overall, these results demonstrate the existence of a positive
feedback mechanism between food price and conﬂict, lending
support to Hypothesis 2b.
Turning to the exogenous variables, the effects of both
Democracyt and Growtht are negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in the conﬂict equation, suggesting that a market is less likely to
experience violence when the state has higher levels of democracy
and economic growth. The coefﬁcient on CivilWart in the conﬂict
equation has the unexpected negative sign, but is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. Thus, civil war onset at the country level loses
its signiﬁcance when the market ﬁxed effects control the
unobserved time-constant factors. The coefﬁcient on GlobalPricet
in the commodity equation is positive and highly signiﬁcant,
Fig. 4. Histogram plots of endogenous variables. Notes: Both variables are centred by their respective market mean values.
Table 1
Summary statistics for endogenous and exogenous variables.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Conﬂictt 0.000 0.517 1.912 3.756
Commodityt 0.000 0.414 1.379 2.006
Rain(+)t 0.395 0.722 0.000 7.038
Rain()t 0.364 0.395 0.000 1.896
Drought 0.033 0.180 0.000 1.000
Democracyt 0.000 1.717 9.075 7.608
Growtht 0.000 0.036 0.137 0.248
CivilWart 0.000 0.137 0.744 0.925
RainySeasont 0.000 0.482 0.842 0.882
GlobalPricet 0.000 26.152 36.317 67.859
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of the local prices in African markets. Lastly, the coefﬁcient on
RainySeasont in the commodity equation is not distinguishable
from zero.
In Model 2, we add exogenous variables for rainfall anomaly to
Eq. (2). The coefﬁcients for Rain()t2, Rain()t3, and Rain()t4
are positive and highly signiﬁcant in the commodity equation;
that is, negative deviations of rainfall from a market’s long-term
averages increase food prices at lags of two to four months. More
speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation decrease in rainfall levels
from the long-term average during the past 30–120 days is
expected to increase food prices by about 9.1 percent, holding
other covariates ﬁxed. This ﬁnding indicates that food price’s
adjustment to climate change takes place after two months of
low rainfall.
Table 2
Conﬂict, food price, and rainfall across Africa, 1997–2010.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent variable: Commodityt
Conﬂictt 0.016
**
(0.008)
0.014*
(0.008)
0.019**
(0.008)
0.021**
(0.008)
0.018**
(0.008)
Rain()t2 0.025***
(0.006)
Rain()t3 0.034***
(0.006)
Rain()t4 0.032***
(0.006)
Drought 0.041***
(0.009)
0.039***
(0.009)
0.030***
(0.010)
RainySeasont 0.003
(0.006)
0.007
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.006)
GlobalPricet 0.001
***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.001***
(0.000)
Commodityt1 0.903
***
(0.006)
0.902***
(0.006)
0.905***
(0.005)
0.902***
(0.006)
0.904***
(0.006)
Monthly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.016**
(0.008)
0.054***
(0.007)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.016**
(0.008)
R-squared 0.891 0.896 0.896 0.891 0.891
Dependent variable: Conﬂictt
Commodityt 0.131
***
(0.028)
0.131***
(0.028)
0.134***
(0.028)
0.133***
(0.028)
0.134***
(0.028)
CivilWart 0.044
(0.044)
0.042
(0.051)
0.046
(0.045)
0.046
(0.045)
Democracyt 0.010***
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.010**
(0.004)
0.010***
(0.004)
0.010**
(0.004)
Growtht 1.078***
(0.264)
1.106***
(0.278)
1.090***
(0.270)
1.084***
(0.268)
1.009***
(0.263)
Rain(+)t 0.002
(0.008)
Rain(+)t1 0.019***
(0.007)
Rain(+)t2 0.005
(0.008)
Rain()t 0.032
(0.020)
Rain()t1 0.054**
(0.026)
0.037***
(0.013)
Rain()t2 0.006
(0.021)
Conﬂictt1 0.349
***
(0.052)
0.344***
(0.051)
0.346***
(0.051)
0.346***
(0.052)
0.349***
(0.052)
Constant 0.005**
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.005)
0.005
(0.007)
0.010*
(0.006)
R-squared 0.160 0.157 0.161 0.160 0.161
N 8541 8426 8467 8502 8541
Log-likelihood 57,130.13 63,957.44 75,111.72 57,164.43 55,010.55
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01. Two-tailed tests.
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the commodity equation, and add Rain(+)t  Rain(+)t2 in the
conﬂict equation. The effect of Drought in the commodity equation
is positive and highly signiﬁcant; the presence of dry conditions
during the preceding months increases food prices in any given
market and month, holding other variables constant. In the conﬂict
equation, we ﬁnd limited evidence for a negative effect of
increased rainfall on conﬂict (see Fig. 6). All coefﬁcients for
positive rainfall deviations have negative signs, although only the
coefﬁcient for the immediately preceding month (Rain(+)t1)
reaches statistical signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding is contrary to the
resource ‘‘abundance’’ perspective, which argues that increased
rainfall creates conditions for violence by encouraging rent-
seeking behaviour. Thus, Hypothesis 1b is not conﬁrmed.
In Model 4, we examine the effects of signiﬁcantly decreased
rainfall on conﬂict by including Rain()t  Rain()t2 in theconﬂict equation. The coefﬁcient for Rain()t1 has an expected
positive sign in the conﬂict equation and is statistically signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 level. Hence, one-month prior negative rainfall
deviations are associated with higher rates of conﬂict (see
Fig. 7). However, this result lends only partial support to
Hypothesis 1a: coefﬁcients for negative rainfall deviations switch
signs at different lags, and the linear combination of all three
coefﬁcients fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
Signiﬁcantly decreased rainfall may affect conﬂict rates
indirectly through the rise of food prices. We calculate the indirect
effects of decreased rainfall and its associated conﬁdence intervals
using formulas presented in Sobel (1987). We ﬁnd evidence for the
presence of such indirect effects. When considering the feedback
loop between food price and conﬂict, the presence of drought
(Drought = 1) raises food prices by about 4.4 percent and this in
turn produces about one more conﬂict event within a given market
Fig. 5. Reciprocal effects between conﬂict and food price. Notes: A and B were generated using Model 1. Dashed lines represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.
C. Raleigh et al. / Global Environmental Change 32 (2015) 187–199196and month. Table 3 summarizes the indirect effects of rainfall
anomalies on conﬂict. These results provide strong support for
Hypothesis 3. Finally, Model 5 is a trimmed speciﬁcation including
only variables signiﬁcant in Model 4; no substantial differences are
found between the two model results.
5. Discussion
In this article, we explore the evidence for feedbacks and
sequential effects between conﬂict, food price, and climate change.
Our ﬁndings suggest that (i) higher rates of conﬂict are expected in
markets with higher food prices; (ii) violence raises the average
price of commodities in markets; (iii) anomalously dry conditions
are associated with increased frequencies of conﬂict; and (iv)
decreased rainfall exerts an indirect effect on conﬂict through its
impact on commodity prices. Overall, we contribute to a wider setof literature on climate-security links by emphasizing the role of
intervening and mediating factors linking physical change to
political instability.
Our analysis uses subnational and time varying data for all
three instabilities: monthly market data can more accurately
capture how rainfall variations across a state affect subsistence
commodities, how conﬂict rates affect market stability, and how
the economic health of a region impacts conﬂict rates. Each of
these factors is dynamic over time and space. Together they
suggest that there exists a variation in vulnerability across
markets, and alternative scenarios through which climate impacts
can be addressed: urban markets in states safe from global
economic shocks may be more resilient to variations in climate and
food price through legislation, commodity substitution and
common coping strategies. However, in rural areas without
support, intervention or commodity substitution possibilities,
Fig. 6. Effects of positive rainfall deviations on conﬂict. Notes: Numbers on the x-axis represent the degree of positive rainfall deviations from the long-term market average in
the previous month. This ﬁgure was generated using Model 3.
Fig. 7. Effects of negative rainfall deviations on conﬂict. Notes: Numbers on the x-axis represent the degree of negative rainfall deviations from the long-term market average
in the previous month. This ﬁgure was generated using Model 4.
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political stability of regions. This speaks to the topography of risk
and responses in how environmental security can be addressed by
communities, governments and aid organizations.Table 3
Indirect effects of rainfall anomalies on conﬂict.
Variable Coefﬁcient Robust S.E. P > jzj
Model 2
Rain()t2 0.00360 0.00121 0.003
Rain()t3 0.00493 0.00162 0.002
Rain()t4 0.00454 0.00102 0.000
Model 4
Drought 0.00578 0.00157 0.000
Notes: Effects are calculated using the formulas in Sobel (1987).The links between economic instability and violence is
suggestive, but not determinative. The differences in perceptions
and consequences of the 2007–2008 commodity price increases
and those of 2010–2011 underscores how political violence in any
form is not a standard reaction to food price vacillation. In 2010,
harvests were healthy and crucially, governments sought to
inﬂuence the impact of price increases.
In choosing states experiencing a range of conﬂict severity over
1997–2010, we realistically capture how ‘normal’ market and
commodity volatility is within African states. Our ﬁndings can be
generalized outside of our sampled twenty-four African states to
others experiencing a range of instability. Communities in states
experiencing severe violence often adapt to new circumstances by
engaging in normal activities within war economies; this can
include farming, selling goods and incorporating the additional risk
within food prices. This underscores the perception that the most
C. Raleigh et al. / Global Environmental Change 32 (2015) 187–199198vulnerable across developing countries survive through community
assistance, instead of beneﬁtting from external assistance.
Across African states, a more pressing spectre is looming: as
more people become food consumers as well as producers, the
inﬂuence of climate change and the health of markets is
paramount for domestic stability. The ability of institutions and
effective governance to mitigate the negative externalities of
climate change and to dampen the likelihood of higher conﬂict
risks is through policies on food price volatility, market develop-
ment, and time-sensitive supplements to failing markets. Food
price controls are a key area where governments can address
environmental security, but they must be carefully attuned to the
local political and economic dynamics of the locations in which
they are applied.
A number of previous measures to control food price include
market boards, which set prices for staples and export goods.
However, these boards often acted to support and enrich the state
by elevating the national price of goods regardless of local
circumstance. Further, during the 1970s and 1980s, market boards
supported an ‘urban bias’ whereby food prices were set to favour
urban consumers instead of rural producers. This was to curb
possible restive behaviour from urban residents who have a higher
ability of collective action against the government. Political biases
continue to favour of particular markets, in the form of the range of
commodities available, updated infrastructure, security, and
positive interventions. However, the majority of Africans may be
subject to markets with limited and failing infrastructure,
insecurity in a variety of forms, and negative, late interventions.
This limits the ability to address the growing needs of the
populations, and may create a fertile environment for anti-
government sentiment, which can occur in a variety of forms and
have quite serious ramiﬁcations for the stability of the state.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.03.005.
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